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Abstract
States burdened with conflict have been considered to be undesirable destinations 
for foreign direct investment (FDI) due to, inter alia, political instability, regulatory 
unpredictability, and expropriation risk. However, we develop an alternative view 
based on corporate governance and real option theories. We analyze a dataset of FDI 
location decisions made in the Oil and Gas sector by 250 US firms across 44 coun-
tries between 2007 and 2013. After controlling for energy reserves, the results show 
counter-intuitively, that civil war and terrorism risks, and terrorist events are posi-
tively associated with US investment in Oil and Gas. US subsidiaries also show high 
levels of ownership commitment. It is tempting to conclude that US Oil and Gas is 
a wholly unique, resource-bound case, but we argue that this disconnect may have 
occurred for two reasons. First, a threat of conflict and violence can make MNEs 
exercise their growth options and expand resource extraction sooner rather than 
later. Second, political instability does not necessarily lead to higher levels of FDI 
expropriation risk. On the contrary, instability can reduce the incentives for the state 
to seize assets from technologically superior MNEs, i.e. it may reduce expropriation 
risk. Just as the rule of law and ‘good’ governance can constrain a state from expro-
priation, there are theoretical reasons why ‘bad’ governance resulting from instabil-
ity and incapacity may do so, too.
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1 Introduction
Countries characterized by extreme forms of political risk and conflict—including 
political violence, intra and inter-state war, and terrorism—are generally consid-
ered to be undesirable destinations for foreign direct investment (FDI) (Busse and 
Hefeker 2007; Driffield et al. 2013). This is attributed to potential losses associated 
inter alia with political instability, regulatory unpredictability, and expropriation 
risk (e.g., Holburn and Zelner 2010; Jensen 2003).
More recent studies, however, point towards a degree of sectoral heterogeneity in 
the response of FDI to conflict: in particular, the relative insensitivity of resource-
seeking FDI to political conflict (Witte et  al. 2017). Furthermore, Biglaiser and 
DeRouen (2007) reported findings that seem counter-intuitive, with societal conflict 
found to have a significantly positive influence on general FDI inflows.
This paper addresses important research questions, as follows. In general, how 
does a host country’s political instability and conflict influence inward FDI and 
its ownership commitment? Can theory explain any sectoral heterogeneity in FDI 
responses to instability? Is FDI by resource-seeking firms attracted to nations with 
societal conflict, and if so, can this effect be fully explained by the availability of the 
resource? Answers to these questions would respond to a recent plea for further con-
textualization of the conflict/FDI relationship (Bailey 2018).
This paper addresses these research questions in the context of the US Oil and 
Gas industry. It begins with a review of the relationship between general country and 
conflict risks and inward FDI in theory and practice in general across all industries, 
and then for resource-seeking firms in particular. This is followed by an analysis of 
ownership mode and foreign entry. A ‘Methods’ section explains our choice of US 
Oil and Gas as a focal industry, and subsequent sections follow the usual sequence 
of results, discussion and conclusions for theory, practitioners and policy.
2  FDI Location Decisions
Dunning’s eclectic OLI internationalization paradigm still dominates IB think-
ing regarding influences on the destination of FDI. Recent comprehensive reviews 
include Nielsen et al. (2017) and Bailey (2018). FDI is expected to flow to any loca-
tion that offers the MNE a suitable combination of OLI advantages.
Here, (O-) ownership-advantages “refer to a firm’s tangible and intangible 
resources […] that a firm may exploit internationally” (Nielsen et al. 2017, p. 65).
On the other hand, (L-) location advantages include lower production costs and 
favorable institutional and political environments (which may be modified by con-
flict risks).
(I-) internalization advantages are rooted in transactions-cost analysis (TCA) 
which identifies behavioral downside risks, involving technological spillovers and 
brand protection, and favoring operations within the firm to market transactions, e.g. 
licensing to host country incumbents.
When all three OLI advantages favor direct investment, inward FDI is predicted.
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This prediction is strongly supported by a raft of empirical studies. For exam-
ple, political stability, democracy, and rule of law (Bailey 2018), together with 
well-developed formal political and legal institutions, attract inward FDI (Nielsen 
et  al. 2017). An institutional environment conducive to ‘good’ corporate govern-
ance attracts foreign investments (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007). The presence of 
these strong institutions in the host country supports market exchange (Ahsan and 
Musteen 2011). It follows that negative influences, institutional voids (Khanna and 
Palepu 2005) and high country risks in general should have adverse consequences 
for inward FDI via L-advantages. This is confirmed by the meta-study of Bailey 
(2018), by Driffield et al. (2016), and by Goswami and Haider (2014); who find FDI 
was discouraged by such factors as corruption, tax rates and cultural distance.
However, slightly different conclusions apply to one specific category of country 
risk—violent political conflict. This ranges from the risks of civil war and terror-
ism, and terrorism events, to war between nations: all studied below in relation to 
US Oil and Gas. Consistent with OLI theory, decades of research (Chen 2017; Dai 
et al. 2013; Li and Vashchilko 2010; Nigh 1985) have associated political violence 
negatively with overall inward FDI. Mancuso et al. (2010, p. 787) report “a general 
consensus in the literature that increases in terrorist activity or risk reduce the inflow 
of FDI”. However, while Witte et al. (2017) support this ‘general consensus’ over-
all, they note the insensitivity of resource-related FDI to political conflict. This they 
attribute to the high profitability of natural-resource extraction and to the geographic 
constraints on location choice. As noted above, Biglaiser and DeRouen (2007) 
report a positive, counter-intuitive relation between societal conflict and FDI for fif-
teen Latin American countries, 1980–1996. This they attribute to natural resource 
discoveries in Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.
Resource-based firms and industries as possible exceptions in relation to political 
conflict and FDI raise a new possibility. Rather than being attracted only to countries 
offering ‘good’ governance, resource-extractive firms may have developed capabili-
ties that enable them to survive and thrive in hostile, ‘bad’ governance environments 
(Frynas and Mellahi 2003).
3  Resource‑Based FDI and Political Conflict
This ‘bad’ governance hypothesis can be explained by real options and corporate 
governance theories. OLI theory views country risk negatively as a cost and deter-
rent to FDI that can be reduced overall by international diversification (Chung et al. 
2013). In contrast, a real option approach1 emphasizes the valuable “sequential flex-
ibility with which a productive resource or asset can be designed, acquired, utilized, 
improved or scrapped” (Driouchi and Bennett 2011, p. 206). Firms can use this 
flexibility strategically to limit downside risk and exploit emerging upside potential 
1 A real option is defined as “a right, but not an obligation, to take some future specified action at a spec-
ified cost. At its core is a fundamental decision asymmetry to take a future decision (e.g., invest) only if 
it’s beneficial to the decision maker, but not otherwise” (Trigeorgis and Reuer 2017, p. 43).
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under uncertainty. The upside potential in the form of opportunities for international 
entrepreneurship may indeed be significant in unstable and risky countries that are 
characterized by market dislocations and disequilibria (Di Gregorio 2005). In this 
respect, a real option perspective accords with the literature on entrepreneurship 
which views risks as two-sided opportunities. Consequently, Trigeorgis and Reuer 
(2017) identify five types of real option: options to defer (or stage), grow, change 
scale, switch or abandon. In particular, growth options are created at market entry 
and facilitate “enlarging a new foreign subsidiary by subsequent investment” (Fisch 
2011, p. 517). It is argued below that growth options have the greatest significance 
for resource-seeking firms.
Oil supply is often flexible upwards and downwards, often depending on the 
resource’s price. Unlike other industries where downsizing is costly, however, 
reduced resource extraction often leaves resources ‘in the ground’. These assets may 
even increase in value when left alone. It is difficult to judge the value of these unre-
covered minerals and energy resources, since most national accounting conventions 
for extractive firms exclude from balance sheets the potential value of resources 
acquired by subsidiaries until they are extracted or processed (e.g., Securities and 
Exchange Commission 2010). Nevertheless, in the USA the SEC does require Oil 
and Gas companies to disclose the volume of their reserves in supplementary docu-
ments, suggesting that unrecovered reserves represent valuable assets for oil and gas 
firms. For example, the annual report of the USA’s biggest oil and gas company, 
ExxonMobil, shows that in 2017 it possessed proven Oil and Gas reserves repre-
senting 21 billion barrels of oil equivalent. Disregarding the costs of extraction for 
this rough estimate, these barrels valued at over US$73 would imply a total value 
of reserves of $1,533,000 million. These reserves dwarf ExxonMobil’s total book 
assets, worth ‘only’ $348,691 million in 2017. Regardless of accounting conven-
tions, regardless of the current market conditions and the current levels of oil price, 
unrecovered reserves could be extremely valuable to most extractive firms as they 
convey the opportunity to undertake positive net present value projects in the future.
From a real option perspective, the acquisition of reserves by resource-seeking 
MNEs is more likely to confer growth options and pre-emptive, first-mover options 
on subsidiaries, thus increasing the value of investments beyond any values obtained 
through classical investment appraisal (e.g. Discounted Cash Flow) methods. Of 
course, the above ground assets (e.g. facilities engaged in drilling, transferring and 
refining oil) of resource-based foreign subsidiaries could be vulnerable to terrorist 
attacks and destruction, but the most valuable assets may be non-lootable, and safely 
deep underground. Nevertheless, specialist articles on the security of Oil and Gas 
assets are mainly focused on threats to above-ground assets (c.f. Bajpai and Gupta 
2007). Underground assets may continue to appreciate in value even after surface 
installations have been attacked or destroyed. In other words, downside risks may 
be limited in extractive industries, and upside risks with positive real option values 
may be more important than negative pull-out risks, thus encouraging inward FDI, 
despite political conflict.
Of course, expropriation (rather than the destruction of assets) may still be a 
major risk where predatory states prevail, but non-lootability may again prove to 
be important. To the extent that political conflict and violence reduce the capacity 
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of state-controlled domestic firms to operate expropriated assets and businesses, the 
incentives of the state to expropriate technologically superior FDI could be lower 
and FDI could be higher under conflict. We predict that this effect to be more rel-
evant for non-lootable or ‘defendable’ resources, while investments in the country’s 
endowment of lootable natural resources remain vulnerable, likely to be negatively 
affected by conflict.
Lootable resources are those that can be exploited relatively inexpensively for 
profit, usually on a black market. For example, rebels have financed their efforts by 
selling alluvial diamonds found in riverbeds and shorelines that can be relatively 
easily collected with basic equipment and sold as contraband (Lujala et al. 2005). 
These gems are particularly lootable owing to their high value-to-weight ratio that 
makes them easier to smuggle. Contrast this with other natural resources, e.g. min-
erals and Oil and Gas. Extracting oil is capital and technology-intensive and it can 
be highly localized with facilities surrounded by high walls, or perhaps open sea 
(Frynas 1998; Rhuks 2012). Above ground petroleum facilities are vulnerable but 
may be protected by networks of private and state operators and private armies. For 
example, Hirsch and Vidal (2012) reported leaked internal Shell Nigeria documents 
showing $383 million spent on security (40% of Shell’s entire security budget) in 
Nigeria over  three  years. This included a ‘1200-strong internal police force’ plus 
a ‘network of plainclothes informants’. A third of this was spent on third parties, 
including the services of 600 Nigerian police, and 700 members of a ‘joint task 
force’ comprised of army, navy and police.
Even if the impressive military power of companies such as Shell were to be over-
come by state or non-state actors, after expropriation, a state (or rebel group) with 
limited capability is unlikely to be able to run highly complex facilities, particularly 
those involving exploration. Whenever expropriation in the oil and gas sector has 
happened in recent decades it has typically been in states with moderate levels of 
state capacity, management skills and development, e.g. Iran (1951) and Venezuela 
(1976 and 2007), see Mahdavi (2014).
The empirical evidence on conflicted states and inward resource-extractive FDI 
has already hinted at a positive association, arguably reflecting weaknesses in the 
‘good’ governance institutions of host countries, but also their ‘bad’ governance 
potential (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2007; Frynas 1998; Frynas and Mellahi 2003; 
Witte et al. 2017). We propose a real options perspective on this evidence based on 
the ability of MNEs to treat risks as opportunities, plus the governance constraints 
on predatory states contemplating expropriation but confronted by non-lootable 
extractive resources. To summarize, the combination of growth options, resource 
non-lootability and limited state interference, leads us to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis H1: Inward FDI presence in resource-extractive industries is posi-
tively associated with a host country’s levels of political risk and violence.
It will be explained in ‘Methods’ section why US oil and gas FDI was chosen to 
test H1.
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4  MNE Subsidiary Ownership
Besides the presence of FDI, one of our research questions asks how does a host 
country’s political instability and conflict influence the degree of foreign ownership 
of MNE subsidiaries? To address this question, we need to consider again briefly the 
theoretical predictions of traditional entry mode theory and of real options theory.
Traditional entry mode theory, like much of OLI theory, is mainly based on Oli-
ver Williamson’s Transactions Cost Analysis (TCA), but is focused primarily on 
the internal, negative behavioral uncertainties of market transactions (e.g. contrac-
tual opportunism and ‘hostage-taking’) rather than on exogenous uncertainties like 
political conflict in a host country (Ahsan and Musteen 2011). However, some stud-
ies have extended the entry mode approach to embrace institutional uncertainties 
through their impact on behavioral uncertainty. According to TCA, MNEs encoun-
tering high levels of uncertainty are predicted to prefer high commitment/high-
control vertical integration to reliance on markets or more market-like entry modes 
(c.f. Brouthers 2002; Meyer et al. 2009). In contrast, in host countries with strong 
institutions that encourage low-commitment market exchange, MNEs can rely on 
their host-country partners (Ahsan and Musteen 2011). By implication, high levels 
of exogenous uncertainty (e.g. political conflict) and weak institutions are likely to 
invite high levels of ownership commitment and vertical integration.
The discussion of FDI presence in the previous section suggests that real option 
theory generates propositions for resource-extractive firms that contradict those 
from TCA-based internationalization theory. Real option theory proposes that FDI 
in extractive industries may increase where environmental uncertainties are high. In 
the case of entry ownership modes, however, a real options approach reinforces tra-
ditional, TCA predictions, i.e. each theoretical perspective predicts higher commit-
ment levels under high uncertainties. We are convinced by the logic of Li and Rug-
man (2007), and suggest that resource-extractive firms are likely to be confronted 
by growth, rather than deferment, options. Growth options imply higher ownership 
commitments under greater local exogenous uncertainties. Li and Rugman (2007, p. 
691) recognize “the value of growth options […] where a high level of uncertainty 
may not discourage firms from strong commitment to a market”.
Traditional entry mode theory and real option theories may therefore be seen to 
be in unusual alignment in relation to MNE parents’ ownership levels in foreign 
resource-extractive subsidiaries. Accordingly, we propose:
Hypothesis H2: MNE ownership in foreign resource-extractive subsidiaries is 
higher in a host country with high levels of political risk and violence.
As with FDI presence and H1, the next section explains our choice of FDI in the 
US Oil and Gas industry to test H2 in relation to subsidiary ownership.
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5  Methods
A possible positive association between political instability and inward FDI in 
extractive industries is a relatively new and under-researched phenomenon. This jus-
tifies the selection of the US Oil and Gas industry as our empirical focus, since Oil 
and Gas installations are technologically demanding and need to be part of a com-
plex supply chain. Both are argued to deter expropriation. The first empirical task of 
our research strategy is to investigate H1 and H2 in the most propitious of circum-
stances and industries favoring these hypotheses and then subsequently to extend the 
analysis to other extractive, resource-seeking industries.
We restrict the sample of the host countries to the 58 with proven gas or oil 
reserves as determined by the BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2014), with 
the USA excluded. Furthermore, and in contrast with previous studies (e.g., Drif-
field et al. 2013; Witte et al. 2017), we employ regression specifications that explic-
itly control for country-specific amounts of Oil and Gas resources (Proven Oil/Gas 
Reserves). The importance of this and other controls is explained in detail in ‘Vari-
ables’ section, below.
Firm-level data on the value of inward FDI is unavailable without primary sur-
veys, and none have yet been conducted in the EU and USA (Nielsen et al. 2017), 
though Frynas et al. (2006) do use three narrative case studies that may have limited 
generalizability. Researchers have therefore had to fall back on country-level stud-
ies or use an FDI proxy in the form of increases in the number of foreign firms at a 
specific location (Nielsen et al. 2017). The latter approach is employed here, though 
of course this gives no precise indication of the scale of inward FDI. More specifi-
cally, following Driffield et al. (2013), we analyze the probability (likelihood) of US 
firms reporting Oil and Gas subsidiaries in a host country as a proxy for FDI. On the 
other hand, data on subsidiary ownership is available at a firm level, obtained from 
the proprietary dataset provided by Bureau van Dijk that identifies foreign firms 
2007–2013, directly or indirectly owned by US parents. The sample includes all US 
Oil and Gas sector firms in the database and also includes those non-Oil and Gas 
sector US firms that had ownership stakes in at least one foreign Oil and Gas sec-
tor subsidiary in any year from 2007 to 2013. This identifies a wide sample of firms 
potentially interested in the ownership of foreign Oil and Gas subsidiaries.
Our choice of appropriate statistical model is driven by the following considera-
tions. First, the ownership type decision (H2) and investment decision (H1) could 
potentially be correlated and driven by some unobserved firm-level heterogeneity. 
Second, we only observe ownership preferences in those firm/country dyads where 
the investment takes place; the ownership decisions are censored. Accordingly, we 
use the following bivariate probit model with selection correction2 to test for H1 and 
H2:
(1)Invest_Oili,t = I
(
xi,t𝛽 + ui,t > 0
)
, (investment or selection regression)
2 This model is implemented in STATA with the heckprobit command (Van de Ven and Van Pragg 
1981).
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Index i defines firm/country dyads and t indexes years. The dependent variable 
Invest_Oil in the selection (probit) regression (1) equals one if the US firm reports 
Oil and Gas subsidiaries in the host country in year t and is zero otherwise. The 
dependent variable Majority_Owned in the ownership (also probit) regression (2) is 
observed only for the firms that choose to invest and equals one if the firm owns a 
majority stake (50% or more) in (at least one) of the reported subsidiaries in the host 
country; and zero otherwise.
Explanatory variable sets x and z include both country-specific and firm-specific 
covariates. The choice of explanatory variables is explained in detail in the next sec-
tion. Control variables also include year dummies that control for worldwide eco-
nomic fluctuations that give rise to general annual heterogeneity in oil prices and 
in the Oil and Gas market. One possible approach would be to control for oil price 
using a price index; but this would potentially miss out on other likely sources of 
global heterogeneity, such as, for example, the availability of credit and the tightness 
of financial markets in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. We therefore use annual 
year dummies in all specifications to control for unobserved annual heterogeneity 
that affects markets equally and at the same time. In the rest of this section, we make 
further points on identification, on the nature of conditional correlation 휌 , and on 
standard errors.
Identification: As with identification strategies that are commonly used in closely 
related Heckman selection models, the identification of the selection mechanism (1) 
in the bivariate probit model (1)–(2) requires an explanatory variable that appears in 
selection Eq. (1) but does not appear in the ownership Eq. (2). We propose an iden-
tification strategy based on the profit-maximising nature of MNEs as follows. Model 
(1)–(2) assumes that firms choose optimal ownership types (which might depend on 
the local institutional environment, political risks and the characteristics and com-
petences of the firm) and invest if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs. Per-
haps unsurprisingly, expected profits from this “optimally owned” subsidiary, and 
hence the decision to invest, are likely to be affected by Proven Oil/Gas Reserves. 
In this scenario, the country-specific amount of reserves affects the selection regres-
sion (the decision to invest) and does not affect the ownership type preferred by the 
firm directly, i.e. Proven Oil/Gas Reserves may stimulate FDI but need not affect 
who finances the investment. Majority ownership by US parent company or by out-
side (e.g. by local) investors may be unaffected. This exclusion restriction identifies 
model (1)–(2).
The nature of correlation: Importantly, it can be expected that ownership type 
Majority_Owned and investment decision Invest_Oil are not conditionally independ-
ent (i.e. 휌 ≠ 0 ). If firms that are more likely to invest also have systematic prefer-
ences towards majority or minority ownership, the unobserved heterogeneity in the 
ownership and in the selection equations are correlated, which means that censored 
(2)
Majority_Ownedi,t = I
(
zi,t𝛾 + ei,t > 0
)
, (ownership regression)
s.t. ∶ u, e ∼ N(0, 1); corr
(
ui,t, ei,t
)
= 𝜌, and
Majority_Ownedi,tis observed only if Invest_Oili,t = 1
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ownership types are not missing randomly. Some of the correlated unobserved het-
erogeneity could stem from firm-specific capabilities and factors such as, for exam-
ple, the prior experience of top management with internationalization strategies. 
Hence, we include firm indicator variables in x and z to control for unobserved het-
erogeneity at the firm level. Further unobserved heterogeneity might be present at 
the level of firm/country dyads. Clearly, this type of heterogeneity can neither be 
adequately corrected by firm-level variables, nor by firm indicators. Consistent and 
efficient estimates in such circumstances require models with selection correction 
that explicitly model 휌 ≠ 0.
Standard errors: We report cluster-robust standard errors clustered on countries 
that are appropriate when main explanatory variables of interest are both country-
specific and persistent over time, as is in our case (Abadie et al. 2017; Cameron and 
Miller 2015). In alternative specifications, we also use standard errors clustered on 
firms. Firm-level clustering greatly inflates statistical significance of country-level 
variables while statistical inference of firm-level variables (i.e. firm size) does not 
change.
6  Variables
6.1  Dependent Variables
We choose not to aggregate data at the country level as the investment and the own-
ership decisions are correlated at the firm level. Some important (unobserved) heter-
ogeneity might be lost if the investment and the ownership regressions are, instead, 
analyzed at the country level. The dependent variable Invest_Oil in the selection 
regression (1) is defined for firm-country-year triads and is equal to one if the US 
firm owns an ownership stake in an Oil and Gas sector firm in the host country and 
zero otherwise (Table 1).
The dependent variable Majority_Owned in the ownership regression (2) is 
observed only for the firms that choose to invest. It equals one if the firm owns a 
majority stake (50% or more) in (at least one) of the reported subsidiaries in the host 
country; and zero otherwise.
Table 2 presents summary statistics on all variables used in the study. The final 
sample contains subsidiary ownership information for 250 US firms reported across 
44 host countries. The sample consists of 53,803 firm-country-year triads. Sample 
firms report subsidiaries (at least one or more) in 2361 triads.
6.2  Explanatory Variables
The next six measures capture the threat and impact of armed conflict and unrest.
Civil War Risk: We focus on civil and interstate war, as variants of political insta-
bility, drawing on the IHS Economics and Country Risk analysis. This
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“scores risks based on expert understanding of the political, economic, social, 
and security environment, using economic models, information from open 
sources, and structured intelligence gathered by a network of thousands of in-
country personnel in-house expertise and models, [and] experts in the field and 
in-country sources with proven records of reliability” (IHS 2015).
One of the benefits of the IHS data is that it is forward-looking (one year) and 
thus appropriate for forecasting the types of risk expected to influence investors. 
Civil war risk is the “risk of intra-state military conflict, in the form of an organ-
ized insurgency, separatist conflict, or full-blown civil war, in which rebels/insur-
gents attempt to overthrow the government, achieve independence, or at least heav-
ily influence major government policies” (IHS 2015).
Interstate War Risk: Drawing on the IHS dataset derived above, Interstate War 
Risk measures the “risk that the country will be subject to use of force by another 
state […] covering the spectrum from targeted military strikes against limited targets 
to full-scale war with the aim of changing the government and/or occupation” (IHS 
2015). It ranges from 0 (no territorial or other disputes) to 10 (“ongoing interstate 
military conflict involving major ground/air operations, with the aim of changing 
the government or one will almost certainly erupt in the 1-year outlook”, IHS 2015). 
The following two variables are also taken from IHS.
Terrorism Risk is the risk that “activities of any non-state armed group or indi-
vidual cause (or are likely to cause) property damage and/or death/injury through 
violence” (IHS 2015) including organized crime. It ranges from 0.1–0.7 with no or 
little terrorism to 6.5–10 with “major attacks […] against buildings, transport, and 
Table 2  Descriptive statistics
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Invest_Oil 53,803 0.0439 0.2048 0 1
Majority_Owned 2361 0.4553 0.4981 0 1
Log Assets 53,803 14.7386 3.3300 − 2.813 21.58
Democracy 53,803 3.7485 6.6558 − 10 10
Rule of Law 53,803 0.0046 1.0018 − 1.79 1.97
Civil War Risk 53,803 1.3206 1.0064 0.06 4.51
Interstate War Risk 53,803 1.5258 0.80115 0.1 4.4
Labor Strike Risk 53,803 2.5094 1.0588 0.4 6.4
Terrorism Risk 53,803 2.3233 1.2880 0.4 6.36
Terrorism Events 53,803 1.8701 2.0673 0 7.7026
Battle Deaths 53,803 1.2517 2.4872 0 8.7617
High-Tech Exports 53,803 9.3595 9.5108 0.0013 46.5739
Inflation 53,803 6.1059 5.6562 − 4.8632 40.6394
GDPC 53,803 8.7143 1.3523 6.3405 11.1346
Proven Oil/Gas Reserves 53,803 2.1683 1.7959 − 1.0922 5.8628
Distance from US 53,803 9.0625 0.4954 7.3988 9.6291
OPEC 53,803 0.1672 0.3731 0 1
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public places […] most days as the state confronts numerous, well-armed, highly 
motivated and organized insurgents” (IHS 2015) with significant loss of life and 
property.
Labor Strike Risk is the “risk that strikes cause damage to assets, business disrup-
tion, or injury” (IHS 2015) ranging from 0.1–0.7 with only occasional strike action 
with minimal disruption, to 6.5–10 with severe disruption, violence, and significant 
damage to facilities and infrastructure.
Terrorism Events: The annual count of terrorism events, converted into rate per 
1000 population. Unlike the IHS-derived variables, Terrorism Events is based on 
actual reported events and not based upon perception. We use this as an alterna-
tive measure of instability in robustness checks. These data are calculated from 
the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s 
(2016) Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (2016). The GTD defines a terrorist attack 
as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to 
attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intim-
idation”. The act must be intentional, involve violence or the immediate threat of 
violence, and the actor cannot be a state. Two of the following three criteria must be 
satisfied: a political or economic goal; an attempt to influence a wider audience; and 
“the action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities”.
Battle Deaths: The annual count of battle deaths, converted into rate per 1000 
population. Like terrorism events, this measure is based on actual reported statistics 
and not expert perception. These data are from the World Bank’s Open Data (2016) 
and capture all fatalities (including civilians) related to armed conflict. These deaths 
can result from acts of war and include, but is not limited to, guerrilla actions, 
bombings, and crossfire.
6.3  Control Variables
Log Assets: We use the natural logarithm of the total assets of the parent firm 
(lagged by one year) as a proxy for technical/competitive advantage. The literature 
suggests that larger firms enjoy economies of scale and scope, benefit from a less 
restricted access to international capital markets, and are more likely to internation-
alize. Larger firms are more likely to have prior experience with internationalization 
strategies and international trade, and benefit from brand name recognition (Bhau-
mik et al. 2010; Wang et al. 2012). Furthermore, larger firms have means to engage 
in defensive acquisitions in global markets in the game of ‘eat or be eaten’ (Gorton 
et al. 2009).
Rule of Law: The World Bank Governance Indicator (WGI) measure, Rule of 
Law, is used to measure this phenomenon, highly correlated with other WGI meas-
ures (Knoll and Zloczysti 2012). Institutional development of various types is seen 
to be a significant determinant of FDI and development generally (Barry and Tac-
neng 2014; Javorcik and Wei 2009; Jensen 2003; Morrissey and Udomkerdmong-
kol 2012; Wellhausen 2015). WGI Rule of Law captures perceptions of “the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
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likelihood of crime and violence” (Kaufmann and Kraay 2016; see also Knoll and 
Zloczysti 2012).
GDPC: the log of host country’s GDP per capita (World Bank Development Indi-
cators 2017). This measure is indicative of state capacity and level of development 
(Jensen 2004) and is commonly used as a control variable in FDI literature (Chakra-
barti 2001). GDPC is highly correlated with Rule of Law measure and is used as an 
alternative control to Rule of Law in robustness checks.
Democracy: the polity measure provides an annual measure of democracy on a 
21-point scale from − 10 to 10 with 10 being the most ‘democratic’. These data are 
from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Gurr 2010) and “consists of six component 
measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on executive 
authority and political competition. It also records changes in the institutionalized 
qualities of governing authority” (Center for Systematic Peace 2016).
High-Tech Exports: The share of high-tech exports in the host country’s export 
(World Bank 2017). This variable controls for efficiency- or asset-seeking FDI that 
targets economies endowed with significant levels of intellectual and human capital.
Proven Oil/Gas Reserves: For our tests, it is important to distinguish the attrac-
tion of resource endowments from country risks. These data are sourced from BP 
Statistical Review of World Economy (2014). We control for the amount of Oil and 
Gas resources in the host country and convert proved gas and oil reserves to Bar-
rel of Oil Equivalent (BOE). The BOE is a unit based on the approximate energy 
released by burning one barrel of crude oil. We use the log of (BOE + 1) to allow for 
country/years that report zero reserves. The time series of proved reserves is lagged 
by 1 year in order to allow for a time lag in investing decisions. To the extent that 
reserves have an independent effect on US FDI and are correlated with main effects 
(e.g. Civil War Risk) and the host country’s institutional development as suggested 
by the ‘resource curse’ literature (e.g. Robinson et al. 2006), including this variable 
controls for potential omitted variable bias. We also note that underground Proven 
Oil/Gas Reserves that await extraction are not directly affected by the main variables 
of interest, i.e. by violence and political risks, nor they are affected by expectations 
of future violence. This means that including Proven Oil/Gas Reserves does not 
introduce a ‘post treatment bias’ with respect to the main variables of interest. This 
is in contrast to non-extractive industries, where the size of domestic market is often 
directly affected by (a threat of) conflict and violence.
Inflation: Sound macro-economic policy and stable macro-economic indicators 
such as low levels of inflation could have a positive effect on FDI (for contrary evi-
dence see Buckley et al. 2007).
Distance from US: the log distance from the US to the host country (in km). We 
assume that investment is more likely close to the company base, supported by a 
literature that suggests distance may be associated with lower levels of cultural dis-
tance, as well as logistical issues (Campbell et al. 2012).
OPEC: OPEC membership dummy (Yes/No). Results reported below are qualita-
tively robust to the exclusion of OPEC dummy from the regressions.
242 R. Skovoroda et al.
1 3
Ta
bl
e 
3 
 Pr
ob
it 
FD
I m
od
el 
wi
th
 se
lec
tio
n c
or
re
cti
on
, U
S 
Oi
l a
nd
 G
as
 F
DI
 lo
ca
tio
n d
ec
isi
on
s, 
clu
ste
r-r
ob
us
t S
E
(C
on
tro
ls)
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
In
ve
st_
Oi
l
M
ajo
rit
y_
 
Ow
ne
d
In
ve
st_
Oi
l
M
ajo
rit
y_
 
Ow
ne
d
In
ve
st_
Oi
l
M
ajo
rit
y_
 
Ow
ne
d
In
ve
st_
Oi
l
M
ajo
rit
y_
 O
wn
ed
In
te
rs
ta
te
 W
ar
 
Ri
sk
0.1
70
 (0
.10
9)
− 
0.3
51
 (0
.33
7)
C
iv
il 
W
ar
 R
is
k
0.3
69
**
 (0
.13
4)
0.5
83
**
 (0
.20
1)
Te
rr
or
is
m
 R
is
k
0.1
93
+  (
0.1
12
)
0.4
39
**
 (0
.12
2)
Lo
g 
As
se
ts
 (T
-1
)
0.1
26
**
 (0
.04
4)
0.4
07
 (0
.43
0)
0.1
26
**
 (0
.04
4)
0.4
18
 (0
.43
6)
0.1
29
* (
0.0
45
)
0.2
45
 (0
.46
8)
0.1
27
**
 (0
.04
4)
0.3
33
 (0
.47
1)
Ru
le
 o
f L
aw
0.3
92
**
 (0
.12
0)
0.5
32
* (
0.2
07
)
0.4
71
**
 (0
.15
4)
0.3
97
 (0
.25
6)
0.5
31
**
 (0
.12
7)
0.4
63
* (
0.2
36
)
0.5
29
**
 (0
.16
8)
0.6
11
* (
0.3
05
)
D
em
oc
ra
cy
0.0
63
**
 (0
.01
3)
0.1
24
* (
0.0
60
)
0.0
62
**
 (0
.01
3)
0.1
28
* (
0.0
55
)
0.0
69
**
 (0
.01
2)
0.1
02
 (0
.06
6)
0.0
57
**
 (0
.01
4)
0.0
91
 (0
.06
6)
H
ig
h-
te
ch
0.0
16
+  (
0.0
08
)
− 
0.0
24
 (0
.02
4)
0.0
20
* (
0.0
09
)
− 
0.0
30
 (0
.02
3)
0.0
20
* (
0.0
08
)
− 
0.0
42
* (
0.0
17
)
0.0
19
* (
0.0
08
)
− 
0.0
35
+  (
0.0
19
)
In
fla
tio
n
0.0
03
 (0
.01
7)
0.0
73
 (0
.04
9)
0.0
04
 (0
.01
7)
0.0
83
 (0
.05
4)
− 
0.0
09
 (0
.01
3)
− 
0.0
02
 (0
.03
4)
− 
0.0
01
 (0
.01
4)
0.0
16
 (0
.03
5)
Pr
ov
en
 O
il 
an
d 
G
as
 R
es
er
ve
s 
(T
-1
)
0.2
29
**
 (0
.05
6)
0.2
28
**
 (0
.05
5)
0.2
55
**
 (0
.04
6)
0.2
47
**
 (0
.05
2)
D
ist
an
ce
− 
0.3
20
* (
0.1
26
)
− 
0.1
72
 (0
.29
7)
− 
0.3
36
**
 (0
.12
3)
− 
0.1
43
 (0
.22
4)
− 
0.3
02
**
 (0
.10
8)
0.0
48
 (0
.42
5)
− 
0.3
12
* (
0.1
38
)
− 
0.1
10
 (0
.48
8)
O
PE
C
− 
0.5
80
+  (
0.3
29
)
− 
1.0
11
 (0
.79
0)
− 
0.5
96
+  (
0.3
26
)
− 
0.9
50
 (0
.77
7)
− 
0.8
55
**
 (0
.21
8)
− 
1.8
24
* (
0.7
51
)
− 
0.7
54
**
 (0
.23
2)
− 
1.7
49
* (
0.7
86
)
C
on
s
− 
0.4
05
 (1
.04
4)
− 
1.1
19
 (1
.93
5)
− 
0.5
56
 (0
.96
9)
− 
0.8
62
 (1
.68
5)
− 
1.0
63
 (0
.90
0)
− 
1.5
10
 (2
.21
3)
− 
0.9
55
 (1
.08
1)
− 
1.2
20
 (2
.20
6)
Ye
ar
 d
um
m
ie
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Fi
rm
 in
di
ca
to
r 
va
ri
ab
le
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
휌
0.4
41
 (0
.58
5)
0.4
68
 (0
.33
7)
− 
0.2
45
 (0
.63
0)
− 
0.0
64
 (0
.87
7)
N
 o
bs
53
,80
3
53
,80
3
53
,80
3
53
,80
3
N
 o
bs
 se
le
ct
ed
23
61
23
61
23
61
23
61
243
1 3
The Attraction of FDI to Conflicted States
St
an
da
rd
 er
ro
rs 
ar
e c
lu
ste
re
d o
n c
ou
nt
rie
s; 
re
po
rte
d i
n p
ar
en
th
es
es
, +
p <
 0.
1, 
*p
 <
 0.
05
, *
*p
 <
 0.
01
Ta
bl
e 
3 
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
In
ve
st_
O
il
M
aj
or
ity
_ 
O
w
ne
d
In
ve
st_
O
il
M
aj
or
ity
_ 
O
w
ne
d
In
ve
st_
O
il
M
aj
or
ity
_ 
O
w
ne
d
Te
rr
or
is
m
 E
ve
nt
s
0.1
26
* (
0.0
54
)
0.1
34
+  (
0.0
77
)
Ba
ttl
e 
D
ea
th
s
0.0
47
+  (
0.0
28
)
− 
0.0
16
 (0
.06
7)
La
bo
r S
tr
ik
e 
Ri
sk
0.1
71
* (
0.0
86
)
0.5
77
**
 (0
.18
5)
Lo
g 
As
se
ts
 (T
-1
)
0.1
30
**
 (0
.04
4)
0.3
68
 (0
.43
8)
0.1
28
**
 (0
.04
4)
0.3
86
 (0
.41
8)
0.1
26
**
 (0
.04
4)
0.3
05
 (0
.37
4)
Ru
le
 o
f L
aw
0.4
91
**
 (0
.13
1)
0.5
66
**
 (0
.16
0)
0.4
41
**
 (0
.13
5)
0.5
16
* (
0.2
23
)
0.5
07
**
 (0
.12
4)
0.8
83
**
 (0
.23
4)
D
em
oc
ra
cy
0.0
51
**
 (0
.01
5)
0.1
15
+  (
0.0
62
)
0.0
57
**
 (0
.01
5)
0.1
25
* (
0.0
59
)
0.0
59
**
 (0
.01
2)
0.0
74
 (0
.05
2)
H
ig
h-
te
ch
0.0
19
* (
0.0
07
)
− 
0.0
28
 (0
.02
1)
0.0
18
* (
0.0
08
)
− 
0.0
25
 (0
.02
4)
0.0
22
**
 (0
.00
8)
− 
0.0
05
 (0
.02
0)
In
fla
tio
n
− 
0.0
02
 (0
.01
3)
0.0
43
 (0
.03
3)
0.0
02
 (0
.01
7)
0.0
77
 (0
.05
0)
0.0
06
 (0
.01
7)
0.0
69
 (0
.04
7)
Pr
ov
en
 O
il 
an
d 
G
as
Re
se
rv
es
 (T
-1
)
0.2
10
**
 (0
.05
2)
0.2
14
**
 (0
.06
0)
0.2
39
**
 (0
.05
9)
D
ist
an
ce
− 
0.4
03
**
 (0
.12
2)
− 
0.1
86
 (0
.34
9)
− 
0.3
74
**
 (0
.12
5)
− 
0.1
54
 (0
.30
4)
− 
0.2
85
* (
0.1
44
)
− 
0.1
67
 (0
.22
4)
O
PE
C
− 
0.5
17
+  (
0.2
98
)
− 
1.1
10
 (0
.76
8)
− 
0.5
59
+  (
0.3
25
)
− 
1.0
09
 (0
.79
5)
− 
0.5
69
+  (
0.2
96
)
− 
1.2
83
+  (
0.7
27
)
C
on
s
0.1
21
 (0
.93
4)
− 
0.9
97
 (2
.26
4)
0.0
47
 (1
.03
4)
− 
1.2
04
 (1
.91
3)
− 
1.1
89
 (1
.28
1)
− 
2.3
78
 (1
.64
7)
Ye
ar
 d
um
m
ie
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Fi
rm
 in
di
ca
to
r v
ar
ia
bl
es
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
휌
0.3
87
 (0
.52
6)
0.4
05
 (0
.56
3)
0.4
19
 (0
.52
2)
N
 o
bs
53
,80
3
53
,80
3
53
,80
3
N
 o
bs
 se
le
ct
ed
23
61
23
61
23
61
244 R. Skovoroda et al.
1 3
7  Results
Our findings support studies indicating US Oil and Gas FDI is attracted to countries 
offering ‘good’ governance institutions such as rule of law and democratic control 
(c.f. Bailey 2018).
However, our focus is on the role of armed conflict and unrest and the possi-
bility that firms may have developed capabilities to exploit both political stability 
and political risk in different environments. Turning to our two hypotheses based on 
‘bad’ governance and real options theories: Models 1–6 (see Table 3) demonstrate 
ceteris paribus that all six types of political risk and violence (Interstate War Risk, 
Civil War Risk, Terrorism Risk, Terrorism Events, Battle Deaths, Labor Strike Risk) 
report positive point estimates in investment regressions (Invest_Oil). The effects 
of Civil War Risk, Terrorism Events, and Labor Strike Risk are strongly statistically 
significant and the effects of Terrorism Risk, and Battle Deaths are weakly signifi-
cant, thus supporting H1.
Corrected for selection bias, ownership regressions (Majority_Owned) show 
Civil War Risk, Terrorism Risk, and Labor Strike Risk, are positively and signifi-
cantly associated with majority ownership. Terrorism Events is weakly positively 
associated with majority ownership. Hence, H2 is supported. The values of corre-
lation coefficient 휌 are mostly positive across models 1–6. Positive 휌 values mean 
unobserved factors that increase the probability of a US firm being in the country 
also increase the probability of majority ownership. However, reported 휌 values are 
not statistically significant. This suggests firm-level indicator variables provide a 
reasonable control for selection bias. While investment and ownership decisions are 
correlated at the firm level ( 휌 values are positive and significant if firm-level indica-
tors are omitted), there seem to be no further correlation at the level of firm/country 
dyads.
While both H1 and H2 are supported, the level of support is strongest for Civil 
War Risk, Terrorism Risk, Terrorism Events and Labor Strike Risk. Findings for 
Interstate War Risk are inconclusive. The latter result is discussed below.
Turning to the control variables, FDI location decisions (Invest_Oil) are posi-
tively correlated with Log Assets, Rule of Law, Democracy, Proven Oil and Gas 
Reserves, High-Tech Exports, and negatively correlated with Distance from the US, 
and OPEC. These relationships have expected signs in agreement with prior stud-
ies. Ownership regressions (Majority_Owned) show that, once invested, Rule of Law 
and Democracy are positively associated with MNEs holding majority ownership 
stakes.
We also report the controls-only model in Table 3 for comparison purposes.
We proceed with robustness checks as follows. First, we perform a subgroup 
analysis for the subsample of large firms (top 50% of firms by total assets) to see 
if the reported effects associated with political risk and unrest are robust across 
the firms that are relatively more likely to invest. Table 4 reports the correspond-
ing coefficients of the political risk variables for the subsample of large firms. The 
results for control variables are not reported for brevity. All regressions use the same 
set of control variables used in Table 3. The results show that both H1 and H2 are 
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generally supported in the subsample of large firms with respect to Civil War Risk, 
Terrorism Risk, Terrorism Events and Labor Strike Risk. The weakest support is 
reported with respect to Interstate War Risk and Battle Deaths. 
Second, we use industry-level indicator variables instead of firm-level indica-
tors to investigate a possible over-specification of the benchmark model reported 
in Table 3. The results, available from the authors upon request, are robust in this 
alternative specification. The inference with respect to H1 and H2 is unchanged. As 
we expect, when industry indicators are used, some uncontrolled firm-specific het-
erogeneity remains and it is picked up by the correlation coefficient levels 휌 that are 
both higher than those reported in Table 3 and are strongly statistically significant. 
Next, we confirm the statistical inference with respect to H1 and H2 in alternative 
specifications where we use two alternative controls to Rule of Law–Control of Cor-
ruption (WGI measure) and, independently, the log of host country’s GDP per capita 
(GDPC). It has been suggested that host countries with high levels of corruption 
could confer higher levels of first-mover advantage to selected MNEs (Frynas et al. 
2006). Both H1 and H2 are supported in these robustness tests, while Control of 
Corruption and GDP per capita are positively and significantly correlated both with 
FDI presence and with majority ownership. We also confirm our results in a set-
ting where we drop Democracy control. These results are available from the authors 
upon request.
8  Conclusions
We investigate FDI location decisions in Oil and Gas made by 250 US Oil and Gas 
firms across 44 countries, 2007–2013. In this final section we draw conclusions for 
theory, business practice and policy, and recognize the limitations of our study.
FDI and high levels of MNE ownership in foreign subsidiaries (including Oil 
and Gas) are generally attracted to countries with stronger institutions and stronger 
rule of law but at the same time, civil war risk, terrorism risk, and terrorism events 
are also positively associated with Oil and Gas FDI. We note the importance of 
non-lootable resource investments and also demonstrate that intra and inter-state 
war have different effects, with some political instability and intra-state war posi-
tively associated with Oil and Gas FDI, while inter-state war risk is not statistically 
significant.
This paper makes a contribution to the IB literature by developing theoretical 
explanations for this counter-intuitive phenomenon both in terms of real options 
for resource-extractive based firms, and reasons why even predatory states may not 
find it easy to expropriate the assets of foreign extractive firms. Foreign firms may 
identify valuable growth option opportunities for FDI in circumstances where states 
find it difficult to expropriate their assets. Therefore, entrepreneurial Oil and Gas 
firms with ambidextrous strategies may be willing to invest either in countries where 
states are constrained by ‘good’ governance (rule of law, democracy), or alterna-
tively in where state interference is inhibited by state instability, incapacity and 
resource non-lootability. In this way, certain firms may be able to exploit each gov-
ernance category to their advantage.
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The only risk variable that does not exhibit a positive relation with inward FDI 
is interstate war risk. It would appear that the threat of interstate war does change 
the FDI/country risk relation since it introduces the possibility of the takeover of 
national institutions by another hostile state that may already have its own sources of 
revenue and a disregard for non-lootability and expropriation. With this threat, some 
MNEs may exercise their hold-off options and reduce FDI and our failure to detect 
the average effects of interstate war risk could mask the underlying heterogeneity 
in MNEs’ responses. Of course, further contextualization of statistical models with 
more detailed conflict-related characteristics could yield more refined findings.
In addition to developing this counter-intuitive view of the influence of political 
instability on inward FDI in a single, though important, industry, we also suggest 
a new perspective on first-mover advantages. Thus, far, it has been suggested that 
first-mover advantages for firms investing in high-risk environments, e.g. host coun-
tries with relatively high levels of corruption, have been secured by firms establish-
ing early close relations with host governments (Frynas et al. 2006).
In the case of Oil and Gas, however, it is argued that the majority of assets are 
relatively non-lootable and therefore less susceptible to corruption among state offi-
cials. Furthermore, our empirical focus on US firms means that the activities of Oil 
and Gas subsidiaries are more likely to face criticism or questioning from home 
country institutions and stakeholders regarding unethical behavior (Driffield et  al. 
2013). In this context, first-mover advantages are less likely to be secured through 
close ties with host governments, but may instead be secured by early FDI in energy 
reserves that host country governments are incapable of exploiting on their own, 
conferring growth options on Oil and Gas subsidiaries. Real option theory, there-
fore, gives quite a distinctive perspective on first-mover advantages. We do not 
suggest that this perspective is universally applicable, though it may apply to other 
resource-extractive industries besides Oil and Gas.
Besides FDI presence, the results also support H2 in that higher subsidiary own-
ership levels are positively associated with conflict risks, again consistent with the 
possibility that ‘bad’ governance may promote overseas investment in Oil and Gas. 
While the rule of law and other institutions can constrain a state from expropriat-
ing assets, so can instability, conflict and incapacity. If the results reported here are 
reproduced for other extractive industries, it may suggest a need for bespoke FDI 
theories for this sector based on corporate governance and real option theorizing.
Academics risk accusations of impertinence when they dare to offer advice for 
practitioners, especially when they have simply observed the investment patterns of 
entrepreneurial firms actually operating in environments that are extremely unstable 
and risky. Nevertheless, it may be useful for practitioners to be aware of the big-
ger picture, e.g. other extractive firms may learn from the experiences of Oil and 
Gas. The asset portfolios of firms in these industries and their growth options may 
mean that a search for ‘good’ governance institutions may be disregarded in favor 
of an entrepreneurial perception of conflict risks as opportunities as well as threats. 
Retaining a high proportion of MNE ownership in foreign ventures in these circum-
stances may prove to be the best way to accommodate the risks associated in arms-
length market transactions.
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Oil and Gas was explicitly chosen for this study as an outlier industry most likely 
to demonstrate the attraction of FDI to unstable environments. The task for future 
research may be to investigate whether conclusions developed from US Oil and Gas 
firms may be extended to other extractive industries.3 It may also be possible to 
investigate why interstate conflict has no significant impact on inward FDI.
Our findings may also have policy implications. First, the ‘good’ governance 
agenda being pushed by various international agencies (Goldfinch et al. 2013) does 
seem to be consistent with its positive association with FDI. At the same time, poli-
cymakers may not need to be concerned with ‘bad’ governance when firms seem per-
fectly capable of handling it themselves. Of course, the ‘bad’ governance option may 
be profitable but perhaps ethically dubious. Nevertheless, the instability and incapac-
ity of otherwise unconstrained states, and perhaps even their ethical lapses, might 
provide upside opportunities for investment; as well as risks. According to a former 
US Vice President, Halliburton CEO and famous oilman Cheney (1998, n.p.).
“The good Lord didn’t see fit to put oil and gas only where there are demo-
cratically elected regimes friendly to the United States. Occasionally we have 
to operate in places where, all considered, one would not normally choose to 
go. But we go where the business is”.
A natural suspicion may exist that firms taking advantage of the opportunities 
generated by incapacity, instability and conflict may also contribute to factors that 
maintain (and perhaps even facilitate) it, but there is little evidence to support this 
(Demir 2016).
Our study has limitations. First, while the dataset we use is large, it only includes 
American Oil and Gas MNEs. While the theoretical purpose of a focus on this sin-
gle industry has been explained, it is also possible that boundary conditions apply to 
effects found only in relation to US firms. Indeed, a growing body of research notes 
the importance of cultural distance and colonial heritage in investment decisions. 
For example, MNEs from home countries with high levels of corruption and weak 
rule of law may invest and thrive in host countries with similar characteristics (Drif-
field et al. 2013; Godinez and Liu 2015). However, our study focuses solely on firms 
from a relatively low-corruption environment in the USA. A comparative study that 
included European and Chinese firms could be illuminating.
While this paper investigates the financial years 2007–2013, characterized by 
record high oil price levels and financial market turmoil and instability in the wake 
of the 2008 financial crisis, the relatively recent period 2014–208 has seen oil prices 
testing 13-year lows (before recovering) as technologically superior MNEs have 
been developing and perfecting new and effective extraction methods (e.g. ‘frack-
ing’, horizontal drilling). Whether this combination of relatively lower oil prices and 
new and cheaper extraction technology has made MNEs more (or less) willing to 
cope with political risks could be a focus of further empirical work.
3 E.g., mining giant Freeport-McMoRan in Papua, Indonesia, spent $28 million on private security in 
2010 (Montlake 2012).
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Another possible limitation is that, due to data limitations, we look at location 
presence only and do not analyze the value of the investments. Another interesting 
line of enquiry could be to compare and contrast entry and exit decisions in more 
detail, particularly in the context of state instability.
While our analysis explicitly controls for the country-specific amount of Oil and 
Gas resources, the data on the relative quality of the resource, the depth of the oil 
fields and the associated cost of extraction per unit are unavailable to us. If the rela-
tive quality of the resource and the depth and accessibility of oil deposits is cor-
related with conflict and violence, this data would have to be included in future 
research. Furthermore, any differences between the FDI responses of small, large 
and giant US Oil and Gas could be teased out by longitudinal studies covering more 
time and fewer firms.
Finally, we have not looked at firm performance issues in depth. To what degree 
do the relationships we look at—particularly firm size, technological sophistication, 
and their relationship to forms of state instability—affect performance? This study, 
while reconciling some key ambiguities in the existing literature, also suggests novel 
ways in which FDI studies could be extended.
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